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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
L. CRAIG KNUDSON, a/k/a
LEWIS CRAIG KNUDSON,

.
.•

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

.

vs.

.
..
•
.•
.
.
.

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES and
GOLDIE KNUDSON,
Defendants and
Respondents.

Case No.

18162

•

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from a decision of the Third Judicial
District Court that affirmed an administrative action which had
ostensibly adjudicated Appellant's so-called "support debt" and
attendant obligation to reimburse the Utah State Department of
Social Services for payments made by the Department to Appellant's
former wife (Co-Respondent) as support for the parties' child.
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
Since the Appellant in the present proceeding was designated
as "Defendant" in the administrative proceedings and since the
Respondents herein were designated "Plaintiffs" in that hearing,

-

this Brief will endeavor to avoid convusion by designating the
parties as follows:

Appellant shall be referred to as "Craig,"

"Craig Knudson" or "Appellant."

Respondent, Utah State Department

of Social Services, shall be referred to as the "Department,"
· 1 S ervices
.
" or "R espo nd en t . "
"Department of S ocia

Respondent,
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Goldie Knudson, shall be referred to as "Goldie," "Goldie
Knudson" or "Co-Respondent."
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Brief of Respondents disagrees (Resp. B. 2 to 4) with
several of the facts enumerated in the Brief of Appellant.

However,

in their Brief on Judicial Review of Administrative Order (R.143)
Respondents stated that they concurred with Appellant's statement
of the facts in Appellant's Brief on Judicial Review of Administrative Action (R.3 to 9) with the exception that Respondents challengec
the fact that the Department of Social Services had received
actual notice regarding the monetary arrangements between Craig
and Goldie Knudson and denied that the Department had acquiesced
to any such agreement.

It was on these facts that the Court below

rendered its decision.

A perusal of the statement of the facts

in the Brief of Appellant (App. B. 2 to 9) will demonstrate that
the facts recited therein, including the summary of those facts,
are virtually identical to those contained in Appellant's Brief
on Judicial Review of Administrative Order.

It is these facts

which are to be reviewed by this Court.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
the Honorable G. Hal Taylor presiding, upheld the Order of the
Administrative Law Judge without comment concerning his ratio
decedendi (R.173).

No argument had been heard (R.169, 173).
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order of the Third
Judicial District Court and of that portion of the· administrative
Memorandum and Order which denies recognition to the reasonable
rental value of the housing and other benefits provided by
Appellant for his family during the period in question and
which thereby adjudicates Appellant's putative "support debt"
in derogation of the facts and circumstances of the case.
Appellant seeks a decision and Order from the Court determining
that he has no obligation to make reimbursement to the Department in this proceeding.

Appellant further seeks an award of his

attorneys' fees.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DEPARTMENT IS BARRED FROM
RECOVERING REIMBURSEMENT FROM APPELLANT
BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.
As was diligently demonstrated in the Brief of Appellant,
the instant case is governed by this Court's ruling in Mecham v.
Mecham, 570 P.2d 123 (Utah

1977).

The Court in Mecham held:
"As to reimbursement for the support furnished to
Maxine Mecham, the Department's rights are derivative and no greater than Maxine's rights.
In her
complaint, Maxine pleaded for temporary alimony.
In the decree, she was denied past and present
alimony; defendant's duty of support was determined,
and the matter is res judicata. The Department
cannot file a complaint one year after a court has
determined the amount of support (in this case
nothing), and demand reimbursement under Chapter 45.
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The same principle applies to child support which
accumulated prior to the date of the [divorce]
decree
Maxine had pleaded in her complaint
for temporary child support; there was no provision
in the decree for any sum expended for support of
the child [during the pendency of the divorce action] . . . Maxine also had a duty to support the
child, Section 78-45-4. Under the decree she was
ordered to assume and pay any and all debts she had
incurred since the filing of the complaint and to
hold her husband harmless.
Maxine did not seek in
the decree any sum for reimbursement for the money
she had expended for support of the child, although
she had put that matter at issue in her pleadings.
The rights of the Department are derived through
Maxine -- the matter is res judicata." Mecham vs.
Mecham, 570 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah 1977) (emphasis
added).
e

•

•

Subsequently, this Court reaffirmed Mecham's cogency under facts
similar to those in the instant case by holding:
"Mecham does not prevent the State from ever obtaining
reimbursement for sums expended by the state prior to
a court decree.
Rather, it merely holds that the State's
right to reimbursement is derivative from the person entitled to support and is limited to the amount of support
fixed by the Court. Because the district court assessed
no child support payments against the defendant until
after the effective date of the decree, the State was not
entitled to reimbursement for those sums expended upon
the child before the decree." Roberts vs. Roberts, 529
P.2d 597, 599 (Utah 1979).
In the instant case, as in Mecham, the Department of Social
Services is seeking to obtain reimbursement for funds given to
the Department's co-respondent -- in Mecham, Maxine Mecham; and
in the instant case, Goldie Knudson -- as "support" for each corespondent's child during the pendency of such co-respondent's
divorce proceeding.

In Mecham (Mecham vs. Mecham, Case No. 14910,

Resp. B. 6 and Appendix A to this Reply Brief) as well as in the
instant case (R.62) an assignment of the co-respondent's right to
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child support was executed in favor of the Department of Social
Services by each co-respondent.

In Mecham the wife filed a complaint

for divorce; in that complaint she sought temporary alimony and
child support; after first scheduling the divorce case for an adversary hearing, the parties presented a stipulation to the court
with the result that the divorce was handled on a default basis;
the record of the divorce proceeding does not indicate that Maxine
Mecham pursued her demand for temporary alimony or support; and,
with respect to child support, the divorce decree merely ordered
the husband to pay Maxine Mecham $75.00 per month as child support.
Mecham vs. Mecham, supra at 124, R.16, 19, 23, Exhibit ''A'' to
Resp. B.

In the instant case the wife filed a complaint for divorce;

she thereafter filed a motion for her husband to show cause why
he should not be required to pay her temporary alimony and child
support during the pendency of the divorce proceedings (Appendix
B to App. B.); this order was accompanied by a supporting affidavit
of Goldie Knudson; the record does not indicate that she pursued
her demand for temporary alimony or support; although the divorce
was originally scheduled for an adversary hearing, the parties in
court agreed to an oral stipulation with the result

that the

divorce proceeded on a default basis; and the divorce decree merely
awarded Goldie child support in the amount of $150.00 per month,
making no mention of temporary alimony or support (R.66, 67, 68,
76' 77).

In neither Mecham nor the instant case did the Department

of Social Services intervene in the divorce proceedings (R.66 to 74,
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Mecham vs. Mecham, Case No. 14910, App. B. 3).

Mecham and the

instant case are, thus, factually indistinguishable.
This Court's theory and declaration that divorce decrees such
as those in Mecham and the instant case should be res judicata
against the Department of Social Services in any proceeding subsequent to the divorce for the purpose of obtaining reimbursement
of sums expended by the Department for the support of the parties'
child during the pendency of the divorce proceedings has been,
again as carefully discussed in the Brief of Appellant, bolstered
by the statute requiring any support obligee who files an action
to recover support to give notice to the Department of Social
Services of such action, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-9(2) (1953); the
statute declaring that any court order embodying a money judgment
for support to be paid to a support obligee by any person shall
be deemed to be in favor of the Department of Social Services to
the extent of the Department's subrogation rights, Utah Code Ann.
§78-45b-3(5) (1953); and the statute providing that the Department
shall have the right to petition· a court for modification of any
court order on the same basis as a party to that action would have
been able to do, Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-3(6) (1953).
However, rather than pursuing Goldie for the breach of her
duty to notify the Department of Social Services of her divorce
action or attempting in a timely fashion -- a possibility whict
no longer exists -- to have the Knudsons' divorce decree modified,
the Department has relentlessly stalked Craig.

Continuing this
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eternal quest, they now suggest, implicitly, that this Court overrule its decision in Mecham or, explicitly, that this Court find
some distinction between Mecham and the virtually identical instant
case.
Yet, the reasoning underlying the decision in Mecham is
sound.

The holding in that case is merely a practical application

of the test established by this Court in Krofcheck vs. Downey
State Bank, 580 P.2d 243, 244 (Utah

1978), for the imposition of the

doctrine of res judicata:
(1)

the two cases must be between the same parties or

their privies;
(2)

there must have been a final judgment on the merits

of the prior case; and
(3)

the prior adjudication must have involved the same

issue or an issue that could or should have been raised therein.
Respondents, appropriately, have agreed that the foregoing is the
proper test to determine when the doctrine of res judicata should
be applied (Resp. B. 5).
An opinion by the United States Supreme Court, furthermore,
demonstrates the correctness of the test which this Court has
established.

In Allen vs. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (em-

phasis added), the Supreme Court declared, "under res judicata,
a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties
or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have
been raised in that action.''

This Court implicitly approved the
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test it had established for determining when to apply the doctrine
of res judicata and defined "privity" in Searle Brothers vs. Searle.
588 P.2d 689, 690-691 (Utah 1978):
"The legal definition of a person in privity with another,
is a person so identified in interest with another that he
represents the same legal right. This includes a mutual
or successive relationship to rights in property."
In several subsequent cases this Court has reaffirmed the concept
that res judicata applies not only to issues which were actually
litigated in the prior proceeding but, also, to those that could
or should have been:

International Resources vs. Dunfield, 599

P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1979), Mendenhall vs. Kingston, 610 P.2d 1287,
1289 (Utah 1980), Bradshaw vs. Kershaw, 627 P.2d

528~

531 (Utah,

19 81).
Respondents agree that the divorce decree in the instant case
constituted a final judgment on the merits of that case (Resp. B.
5); Respondents, however, deny that the other two parts of the
test established in Krofcheck have been met.

But the interest held

by the Department of Social Services in the instant case falls
precisely within the definition of "privity" enunciated by this
Court in Searle:

the Department succeeded to an interest, i.e.,

a claim for child support, formerly held by Goldie Knudson.

Again

as this Court noted in Mecham vs. Mecham, 570 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah
1977),
"As to reimbursement .for the support furnished to Maxine
Mecham, the Department's rights are derivitive and no
greater than Maxine's rights . . . . The rights of the
Department are derived through Maxine . . . . .,
In both Mecham and the instant case the wife had assigned her claim
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for child support to the Deparment of Social Services.

The Depart-

ment, th~refore, was in privity with the wife in each case not only
because of applicable support law, Utah Code Ann. §§78-45-9, 7845b-3 (1953), but also because of a written assignment of rights
to the Department (R.62, Appendix A to App. Reply B., Mecham vs.
Mecham, Case No. 14910, Resp. B. 6, R.33).

Despite the Department's

attempt at legalistic alchemy, any rights it has -- whether statutory or contractual -- are derived through Goldie Knudson;

if she

has no right to support payments for her child, the Department
has none.

Yet, even if the preceding analysis did not establish

that the Department was in privity with a party to the divorce
proceeding in the instant case, the Department would still be
in privity; for both Goldie and the Department, in requesting
that Craig be forced to make payments for child support, are acting
as fiduciaries or guardians for the child of Craig and Goldie
Knudson.

It is the right of this child to support that was

established by the divorce decree; it is the right of this child
that the Department subsequently sought to enforce against Craig
by an administrative proceeding.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure

17(a) (emphasis added) declares:
''Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest. An executor, administrator,
guardian, . . . or a party authorized by statute may
sue in his own name without joining with him the party
for whose benefit the action is brought . . .
When an inf ant or an insane or incompetent person is
a party, he must appear either by his general guardian,
or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the particular
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case by the court in which the action is pending."
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b).
Section 78-45b-l.l of the Public Support of Children Act says, in
part, "it is declared to be the public policy of this state . . .
that children shall be maintained from the resources of responsible
paren t s . . . . "

Both the foregoing quotation and the very title

of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§78-45-1 to 78-45-13 (1953), indicate that the purpose of any
action undertaken by the State of Utah to enforce an obligation
owed to a support obligee, in this case the child of Craig and
Goldie Knudson, is to protect the rights of that obligee, not
the rights of the Department of Social Services.
Respondents further argue (Resp. B. 5) that the remaining
portion of the test enunciated in Krofcheck, i.e., that the prior
adjudication must have involved the same issue or an issue that
could or should have been raised therein, has not been satisfied
in the instant case.

Yet, as noted above, both Maxine Mecham

and Goldie Knudson requested child support during the pendency
of their divorce proceedings.

Maxine Mecham made her request in

her complaint; Goldie Knudson, in an order to show cause (Appendix
B to App. Reply B.).

Additionally, Goldie Knudson filed an

affidavit (R.75 to 77) to prove that she was entitled to child
support during the pendency of her divorce proceedings.

Again

as noted above, the divorce decrees in both Mecham and the instant
case merely provided a sum certain for child support, without
explicitly referring to past support during the pendency of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
., I"\
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

divorce proceedings.

Only such an explicit declaration, either in

Mecham or the instant case, could have made it more clear that
the issue of child support during the pendency of the divorce
proceedings not only could have been, but was actually, litigated.
Respondents were well aware of these facts;

indeed, the very ad-

ministrative order which is at issue in the instant case was
purportedly based, in part, on that same affidavit (R.86).
Even though it is clear from the fact that Craig Knudson
was a party to the divorce proceedings in this case and that the
Department of Social Services is in privity with Goldie Knudson
or the child of Craig and Goldie Knudson, who was or were parties
to the divorce proceeding, that the applicable doctrine to the
instant case is res judicata, respondents challenge application
of the doctrine of collateral estoppel -- a doctrine which applies
when only the side against which a prior judicial ruling is
sought to be applied was a party to the preceding judicial process.
Of course, had Craig not been a party to the divorce proceedings in this case, he would be forced to rely upon the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.

This Court has established

the test which must be met for the imposition of collateral
estoppel in Searle Brothers vs. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah

1978), and Wilde vs. Mid-Century Insurance Company, 635 P.2d
417, 419 (Utah 1981):
(1)

Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
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identical with the one presented in the action in question?
(2)

Was there a final judgment on the merits?

( 3)

Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a

party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?
(4)

Was the issue in the first case competently, fully

and fairly litigated?
Although the discussion of res judicata, above, is sufficient
to demonstrate that were it necessary, Craig could satisfy all
these tests for the application of collateral estoppel, Respondents
assert that the case of Ruffinengo vs. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah
1978), shows that the Department of Social Services cannot be
bound by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

In Ruffinengo at

343 the Court stated, "As to the matter of collateral estoppel,
it is to be noted that Reffinengo was not a party nor in privity
with a party in the prior suit . . . . " (emphasis added).

Ruffin-

engo, however, merely had rights that were identical to a party
in the prior suit; no showing had been made that his rights
succeeded from· .a party to that prior suit, as required by the
definition of "privity" given in Searle, supra, and as did the
Department's rights from Goldie.
This Court in Ruffinengo cited an opinion of the Unitea
States Supreme Court, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. vs.
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971):
"Some litigants -- those who never appeared in a prior
action -- may not be collaterally estopped without
litigating the issue."
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In a subsequent opinion the Supreme Court clarified this statement:
"[W]hile the general rule is that nonparties to the
first action are not bound by a judgment or resulting determination of issues, see Blonder-Tongue vs.
University Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 320-327 (1971),
several exceptions exist.
The pertinent exception
here is that nonparties may be collaterally estopped
from relitigating issues necessarily decided in a
suit brought by a party who acts as a fiduciary
representative for the beneficial interest of the
nonparties." Sea-Land Services, Inc. vs. Gaudet,
414 U.S. 573, 593 (1974).
The Supreme Court, thus, using the language of "exceptions" indicates that the same type of analysis that we used in determining
whether one is in "privity," as defined by Searle, is to be undertaken in order to determine whether an individual or organization
that was not an actual party to a preceding judicial decision can
be bound by that decision.

It is particularly instructive to

note that the Supreme Court determined that collateral estoppel
should be applied to one who acted "as a fiduciary representative
for the beneficial interest of the nonparties," (emphasis added),
as in the instant case did Goldie for her child and, derivatively,
for the Department of Social Services.
Taking another tack, Respondents again assert their erroneous
proposition that Mecham did not involve a situation where the
wife who sought child support in the divorce proceedings had
previously executed an assignment to the Department of Social
Services.

Respondents then claim that this Court ruled in Inter-

national Resources vs. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979), "that
the doctrine of res judicata does not bar an assignor from
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maintaining an action against a debtor, even though the asignee
had brought a prior action.''

In fact, this Court declared on

page 517 of International Resources that there had been no demonstration in that case that any assignment did exist.

In Lynch

vs. MacDonald, 367 P.2d 464, 468 (Utah 1962) (emphasis added),
this Court said, "the general rule is that an assignee is the
real party in interest."

But this does not mean that the assignor

is not a real party in interest.

A number of cases indicate

various situations in which an assignor of an interest is permitted to bring suit.
The court in Harambee Enterprises, Inc. vs. State Board of
Agriculture, 511 P.2d 503, 504 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973), stated,
"If an assignor has not assigned his entire claim,
he can still maintain an action in his own name."
In Warren vs. Kirwan, 598 S.W.2d 598, 600-601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980),
the court was considering an assignment which read, "the Insured
hereby assigns . . . to the Insurer any and all claims or causes
of action

e

•

•

to the extent of the payment above made .

. . ."

The court construed this language, which is remarkably similar
to the language in the assignment of Goldie Knudson on behalf of
the Department of Social Services (R.62), to be a partial assignment and, therefore, to permit suit by the assignor.

The United

States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Hoeppner Construction Company, Inc. vs. United States, 287 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1960),
also ruled that an assignor who has not assigned his entire claim
can maintain an action in his own name.
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The Supreme Court of Minnesota in Dereschuk vs. Knudsen,
280 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn. 1979), citing cases from several other
jurisdictions, held that the assignor in cases where the assignment is for collection only or is given as a mere collateral
security is certainly a party in interest.
In Cantor vs. Union Mutual Life Insurance Company, 547 S.W.2d
220, 225-226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977), another assignment was construed
by the court.

This assignment was of "all my right, title and

interest in said Policy and in and to any and all benfits which
may hereafter become payable .

.

.

"

The court found this to

be an assignment given as collateral security because additional
language in the assignment stated that it was to be "collateral
security for any and all of my present or future indebtedness
to the Assignee."

According to the court,

"[W]here an assignment is given as collateral security
only, the assignor retains such an enforceable substantive right so as to maintain an action, even though
the assignment appears to be absolute in form .
When the assignor maintains suit, the assignee is a
'necessary' party . . . and not an 'indispensable' one."
In C & M Developers, Inc. vs. Berbiglia, 585 S.W.2d 176, 181
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979), another district of the Missouri Court of
Appeals agreed with the holding in Cantor.
Reviewing the assignment in the instant case (R.62), it is
evident that this assignment fits all of the foregoing categories:

it is a partial assignment because it assigns the right to collect
for child support only to the extent that funds had been provided by the Department of Social Services to Goldie on behalf
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of her child, it is an assignment for collection only because its
purpose was to facilitate the Department's efforts to obtain reimbursement for "child support" from Craig, and it is an assignment furnished for collateral security by Goldie to guarantee to
the Department that they would be able to obtain the funds they
desired from Craig.
Yet, even if the assignment in the instant case could not
be classified into any of the categories which have just been
considered, Goldie would have been entitled to maintain an action
in her own name on behalf of her child in accordance with Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b).

As noted in detail above, the

principal purpose of the assignment and of the relevant support
laws of the State of Utah is to ensure that children will receive
the necessities of life; and such children are, therefore, truly
the real parties in interest in any action instituted for child
support, whether it be by the custodial parent of that child or
by the Department of Social Services.

This Court long ago declared

that it would look behind the pronouncements on the face of an
assignment to determine its true purpose.

In Nelson vs. Smith,

154 P.2d 634, 637-639 (Utah 1944), the Court observed that in
view of Article I Section 11 of the Constitution of Utah, no
per~on

could be barred from prosecuting or defending before any

state tribunal by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he was a party.

The court then also noted that an assignee has

the right, in accordance with the Constitution of Utah, to appear
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in court and prosecute or defend an interest which has been
assigned to him.

But, considering the true purpose of the assign-

ment as opposed to its superficial declarations, the court announced
that laymen would not be permitted to evade or circumvent the
statute that required lawyers to be licensed by the State through
the device of taking an assignment of the claim and proceeding in
their own names.
A declaration that Goldie after executing the assignment to
the Department of Social Services no longer had the right to
utilize the legal process to protect the interest of her child
would, furthermore, contravene the spirit of the opinion rendered
by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky vs. Kramer, 71
L.Ed.2d 599, 603 (1982):
"Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably
the rights of parents in their natural child, due
process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence."
And should this Court hold that because of the assignment
from Goldie to the Department of Social Services, the Department
may proceed to enforce that assignment and collect reimbursement
for "child support" from Craig in spite of the divorce decree,
the Department of Social Services would have a veto over the
judicial system of this State.

When a divorce decree would not

be favorable to the Department, the Department would proceed
under its assignment from the custodial parent and ignore the
judicial decree; when a divorce decree would appear pleasing
to the Department, the Department would proceed under its
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statutory right to enforce that decree.
I I.

VIOLATIONS OF APPELLANT'S STATUTORY AND
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY THE DEPARTMENT
SHOULD, AT LEAST, CAUSE THIS CASE TO BE
REMANDED FOR A FULL AND FAIR HEARING.
Perhaps, the most striking feature of the instant case is
the fact that there has never been any adjudication declaring that
Craig Knudson had failed in his duty to support his child.

In

fact, the divorce decree ruled, sub silentio, that Craig had
satisfied all duties of support to his child during the pendency
of the divorce proceedings.
In State Division of Family Services vs. Clark, 554 P.2d
1310, 1311-1312 (Utah 1976) (emphasis added), this Court declared:
"A necessary concomitant of the continuing and inalienable duty of parents to support their children
is that if a child is left in need and a third party
comes to the rescue and furnishes support~ the latter
is subrogated to the child's right and may obtain
reimbursement therefor . . . . The purpose is to
assist in assuring that help will not be withheld
from children in necessitous circumstances. Nevertheless they should be furnished only those things
which are reasonable and necessary, and this may
sometimes vary according to the appropriate standard
of living . . . .
On pages 20 through 27 of the Brief of Appellant in the
instant case, a thorough discussion has been presented of the
specific statutes in the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§78-45-1 to 78-45-13 (1953), which designate
the factors to be considered and the procedural methods to be
utilied in determining the "reasonable and necessary" support
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that a parent is required to furnish his child.

Such statutory

sections make provision for hearings when there is no prior
judicial decree adjudicating the support obligation and, also,
for proceedings when there is a prior judicial decree specifying
the support that the parent or support obliger is required to
furnish.

These statutes indicate that the only course available

to the Department of Social Services when it desires to alter a
divorce decree which has explicitly or implicitly declared that
the support obligor has satisfied all duties of support prior
to the time such decree was entered is to seek a modification
of that decree, "on the same basis as a party to that action
would have been able to do .
(1953).

. . ."

Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-3(6)

But the time period within which Goldie and, therefore,

the Department of Social Services could have properly sought a
modification of the divorce decree in the instant case with
respect to child support during the pendency of the divorce
proceedings has long since expired.
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(2) (1953) (emphasis added) declares
"(2) When no prior court order exists, or a material
change in circumstances has occurred, the court in
determining the amount of prospective support shall
consider all relevant factors, including but not
limited to:
(a) The standard of living and situation of
the parties;
(b) The relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) The ability of the obliger to earn;
(d) The ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) The need of the obligee;
(f) The age of the parties;
(g) The responsibility of the obliger for support
of others."
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This Court in Roberts vs. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597, 599 (Utah 1979)
(emphasis added), raised the requirement that such factors be
considered in determining the duty of a support obligor to Constitutional levels:
"[It] would constitute a denial of due process to the
obligor's spouse if the court assessed the obligor for
all public assistance payments received by the obligee,
without considering relevant factors such as the relative wealth and income of the parties; and the ability
of the parties to earn income. Under [section] 78-457(2) seven such factors are required to be considered
in determining the amount of prospective support. Under
the Public Support of Children Act [78-45b-6(2)],
which provides an administrative procedure for obtaining reimbursement for assistance payments made on behalf
of minor children, similar factors must be considered
in the hearing to determine the extent of the parent's
liability for child support [footnote omitted].
The
assessment of arrearages under [section] 78-45-7(3)
must also be subject to consideration of the same
factors."
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, even were Respondent's dubious assertion that because the
instant case involves an assignment, Respondent could proceed
to determine the support obligation by any method (Resp. B. 13),
true, the Department would still be required to consider, among
other factors, those prescribed in Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(2)
(1953).
In its administrative hearing, the Department provided no
evidence whatsoever bearing upon the standard of living and
situation of the parties, the relative wealth and income of the
parties, the ability of the obliger to earn a living, the

ablity

of the obligee to earn a living, the need of the obligee, the
age of the parties, or the possible responsibility of the obligor
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for the support of others.

Indeed, the Department rested its

case after showing only the amount of the support payments made
to Goldie during the period in question.

No effort was made

to assess all or even to consider most of the other factors
required for a proper determination of the support obligation of
Appellant under the statute.
burden of proof on this issue.

Clearly, the Department had the
The minimal facts that were

presented relative to these considerations were produced by
Appellant.

This modicum of evidence consisted of Appellant's

testimony that during the period for which the Department seeks
reimbursement, Appellant was employed by LaBelle's as an audio
manager (R.A3); that from 1973 through 1975, inclusive, Goldie
earned approximately $6,000 per year (R.45); that from 1975
through 1978 Goldie had no earnings (R.45); that after leaving
Appellant, Goldie requested that Appellant pay $200 each month
as child support (R.45); that Appellant had then declared he
could not afford to pay such support (R.46); and that Goldie
worked during 1979 as a CETA summer work program bookkeeper
(R.51).

Appellant also introduced a certified copy of the

divorce decree (R.66-68), the findings of fact and conclusions
of law in the divorce proceeding (E.69-74), and the affidavit
Goldie had used in an attempt to get support during the pendency
of the divorce proceeding (R.75-77).
In her order the Administrative Law Judge merely considered
the fact that the Department of Social Services had provided

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

support to Craig and Goldie Knudson's child during the pendency
of the divorce proceedings, the divorce decree, the affidavit
submitted by Goldie during the divorce proceedings, and the rental
payments made by Craig for the lot upon which the mobile home
that Goldie and the Knudson's child used as a residence during
the pendency of the divorce proceedings was situated (R.84 to 87).
It is, to say the least, intriguing that Respondents suggest that
they satisfied the demands of Roberts (Resp. B. 13 to 15) by utilizi
the affidavit and divorce decree which they argue would not
meet the test for collateral estoppel, were collateral estoppel
rather than res judicata the appropriate doctrine to apply to
the facts of the instant case.

III.
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE PRECLUDE
THE DEPARTMENT FROM RECOVERING REIMBURSEMENT
FROM APPELLANT.
~ven

were the doctrine of res judicata not applicable to

the instant case and had Respondents considered the required
factors in determining the support obligation, Respondents
should have given Craig credit for the necessities which he
provided to Goldie and the Knudson's child during the pendency
of the divorce proceedings.

Appellants have already elaborately

detailed the legal, Constitutional and factual reasons why such
credit should have been extended (App. B. 27 to 35).

Thus, only

a few points need be mentioned here.
Before a marriage is terminated, the
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breadwinners in the family provide necessities for their children;
they do not necessarily supply the other spouse solely with cash
payments so that the other spouse may purchase necessities for
their children.

And the support statutes considered above speak

in terms of supplying the support obligee with the necessities
of life -- not with cash.

This is why respondents could not find

any cases requiring that support payments prior to the entry of
a divorce decree be made in cash (Resp. B. 16).
Moreover, during the emotional turmoil of divorce proceedings,
the noncustodial spouse may very well furnish necessities rather
than cash to the other spouse on behalf of their child because the
noncustodial spouse, at such a time, may entertain doubts concerning the responsibility of the custodial spouse.
As demonstrated by this Court's opinion in Ross vs. Ross,
592 P.2d 600, 603 (Utah 1979),

a

principal

reason

why payments-in-kind are not permitted to satisfy a judicial
decree when they are made after such decree has been entered is
that permitting such an extra-judicial "modification" of the
decree would necessarily lessen respect for the judicial system
a result which could not transpire before any decree had been
entered.

Furthermore, respondent's theory that credit is not

given for payments·-in-kind made after the entry of a. judicial
decree because "the intent of child support is to allow the
custodial parents latitude in deciding the needs of the child
and not permit the noncustodial parent to dictate where the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-23-

monies are to be expended" (Resp. B. 16) need be of no concern
in the instant case because Goldie, the custodial parent, chose
to return to the housing which Craig supplied (R.44, 46) and for
which Craig requests credit.
And even if the instant case involved payments-in-kind subsequent to the entry of a judicial decree requiring payments in
cash, this Court has recognized that there should be "equitable
exceptions" to the rule that all such post-decree payments must
be in cash.
(dictum).

Openshaw vs. Openshaw, 42 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah

1935)

Then in the post-decree case of Ross vs. Ross, supra

at 603-604, this Court announced,
"Only if the defendant has consented to the plaintiff's
voluntary expenditures as an alternative manner of
satisfying his alimony and child support obligations,
can plaintiff receive credit for such expenditures."
The instant case did, indeed, involve such an agreement (R.46).
In a highly relevant case closely related to the instant
situation a Colorado court has ruled that child support accruing
during a period when a divorced husband and wife were in good
faith attempting a reconciliation should be abated.

In re

Peterson, 572 P.2d 849 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977).
Appellants have demonstrated in detail that under any
financially reasonable

~ystem

of accounting the benefits pro-

vided by Craig to Gol.:.. ·,.~ and the Knudson's child during the
pendency of the divorce proceedings and for which Criig has
received no credit substantially exceed the amount che Department claims it deserves as reimbursement for "child support.''
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The Department of Social Services would have long ago given Craig
credit for such benefits were it more concerned with rendering
due process to the citizens of this state than with its own egocentric desire for administrative convenience.
CONCLUSION
Craig is not trying to avoid his duty to support his child;
he is simply attempting to have recognition given to a prior
judicial determination of what that duty is, to have the proper
factors considered in determining that duty, and to receive
credit for the support he has provided his child.
Therefore, the decisions of the Third Judicial District
Court and the Administrative Law Judge should be reversed; this
Court should declare that Appellant owes nothing to the Department for child support during the pendency of the divorce action.
If this is not done, the Court should, at least, remand the case
so that the statutorily required factual determinations can be
made.

And, in view of the egregiously bad faith exhibited by the

Department in pursuing Appellant, with full knowledge of the
prior divorce decree, contrary to the clear dictates of due
process, relevant statutes, and controlling case law, this Court
should, in all equity and good conscience, award Appellant his
attorney's fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of August, 1982.
JENSEN & LLOYD

Thompson E. Fehr
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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Address of Attorney:

870 Commercial Security Bank Tower
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-0457
Telephone:
(801) 322-2300

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY DELIVERY
I, the unde.rsigned, do hereby certify that I have this
day personally served a true and accurate· copy of the foregoing
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel of record for the
Defendants and Respondents by hand-delivering the same to his
offices in Ogden, Utah as follows:
Robert D. Barclay
Deputy Weber County Attorney
Municipal Building, First Floor
Ogden, Utah 84401
DATED this

day of August, 1982.
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ASSIGNMENT OF COLLECTION OF SUPPORT PAYMENTS

....;)

Forpublica~is~ncereceivedortobereceiv~, l,_~~,~~r~1 r~1~,~~~,~~L·1~c~,~~·~~r~·<~4~:~J~o~r~L~~~~-~~~~1~o~C~1l~~~c~~~Ai1~1~'~~~~~~~~~~herebyassign, tranrierand set over to the Utah State
Assist~nce

.

Payments Administration of the Department of Social Services, all monies payable to me

and/or my child from

8 l·c«h c

)

cQ

i

l,\ tv\.XV

::tu , ci\.o CfY\.1
7

(t\Mme of Absent Parent with Duty of Supporr)

during the time I am or we are receiving public assistance and also past support and alimony due
me, not in excess of amount due while receiving public assistance, and authorize anyone whosoever
to deliver any and all negotiable instruments and/or warrants to be issued under the above duty of

support to the Bureau of Recovery Services, Utah State Assistance Payments Administration, which
is authorized to endorse my name upon and receive any and all funds due or to become due
provided that the balance due on said claim shall be reassigned to me whenever the assignee recovers
in full the sum equivalent to the assistance I have received.

I further authorize said assignee to do every act and thing it deems necessary to collect the
support and/or alimony payments, including taking any and all legal action it deems necessary or
the compromising of my or our claims without further notice to me.

Dated this

r2

~

Day of ~)Jo.a

r

J,

, 19 /

Signature:

•

5 .

::ru Ct y

I

Y\

e ,/. :yt1 cc h
(Applicant or Recipient}
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KELLY G. CARDON, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
2506 Madison Avenue
Ogden, Utah
84401
Telephone: 627-0400
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

GOLDIE KNUDSON

I

MOTION FOR ORDER

Plaintiff,

TO SHOW CAUSE

vs.
L. CRAIG KNUDSON,

Civil No. 71529
Defendant.

~-d

_../ _!{i

Plaintiff moves the Court for an Order directed to
Defendant, requiring him to appear personally before

..-.•••
..•- z
r.

,.

'

,..•

.., ;;..,...,.

he should not be required to pay to Plaintiff such sums as may be

~

< J:
z <

found reasonable for temporary alimony and child support_ money,

s
• -a<::= z

--.,
~

•

Court at

a time and place certain and show cause, if-any he may have, why

~
:>

t~e

0

:I)

and temporary attorney's fees during the pendency of these pro-

~

Q

'.O
~

Ill

~

0

ceedings; why Plaintiff should not be awarded the temporary and

N

~

exclusive use and possession of the mobile home jointly owned by
the parties as a residence for herself and the minor

~hild

ROBERT

CRAIG KNUDSON; and why temporary custody of said minor child
should not be awarded to Plaintiff, subject to reasonable visita-

I

tion by Defendant.
Plaintiff further requests that said Order ~o·show Cause
require Defendant to produce at said hearing a

sta~ement

~f

II

his

I

total income for the year 1978 and the month of January, l979, and-!

!

a statement from his employer setting forth his current rate of
pay and his salary, with deductions, during his
j ·

~ost

recent ?aY

period.

I
I

I

I

This Motion is

~ade

and based upon the papers

~~d

pleadings filed herein and for the reasons more specifically set
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APPENDIX B
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I

forth in Plaintiff's sworn Affidavit annexed hereto and made a
part hereof.
DATED AND SIGNED at Ogden, Weber County, Utah this
day

of -----------------' 1979.
i

'

KELLY G. CARDON, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
I
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